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Abstract
The Challenge from Cognitive Diversity (CCD) states that demography-specific
intuitions are unsuited to play evidential roles in philosophy. The CCD attracted
much attention in recent years, in great part due to the launch of an international
research effort to test for demographic variation in philosophical intuitions. In the
wake of these international studies, the CCD may prove revolutionary. For, if
these studies uncover demographic differences in intuitions, then, in line with the
CCD, there would be good reason to challenge philosophical views that rely on
those intuitions for evidential support. I argue that philosophical views that rely
on demography-specific intuitions for evidential support need not be threatened
by  such  findings.  I  first  provide  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  epistemological
principles driving the CCD and distinguish three formulations of this challenge. I
then show that there are good reasons to reject all such formulations of the CCD.
Keywords:  Intuitions,  Experimental  Philosophy,  Cognitive  Diversity,
Philosophical Methodology, Peer Disagreement
 1. Introduction
A  major  recent  development  in  experimental  philosophy  is  the  launch  of  an  international
research  effort  to  test  for  demographic  variation  in  philosophical  intuitions.2 These
investigations  are  not  due  to  simple  anthropological  curiosity.  Some  have  argued  that  if
intuitions are found to be demography-specific, then they are thereby unsuited to play evidential
roles in philosophy. Call this the Challenge from Cognitive Diversity (CCD). In the wake of a
number of international studies testing for demographic differences in people's intuitions, the
CCD  may  prove  revolutionary.  After  all,  many  firmly-held  philosophical  views  rely  on
intuitions for evidential support.3 And if evidence shows that those intuitions are demography-
specific, then, in line with the CCD, there would be good reason to question such views.
In this paper, I argue that a careful analysis of the epistemological considerations driving the
CCD  give  us  good  reason  to  reject  it,  and  that  philosophical  views  found  to  rely  on
demography-specific  intuitions  need  not  be  threatened  by  such  findings.  To  develop  this
proposal, I first explain the CCD in more detail (sec. 2) and then give a brief overview of recent
arguments by Edouard Machery (2017), which offer perhaps the most careful defence of the
motivations for this challenge (sec. 3). Focusing on Machery's arguments proves instructive as
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this  allows  us  to  tease  apart  three  formulations  of  the  CCD.  In  subsequent  sections,  I
demonstrate that there are good reasons to reject all such formulations (secs. 4 & 5).
Before proceeding, two preliminary points. First, for the purposes of this paper I will use the
term 'intuition'  to  refer  to  a  judgement about  what  is  the  correct  verdict  to  a  philosophical
thought-experiment (or philosophical case).4 There are of course many bells and whistles one
can add to an account of intuitions.5 However, for current purposes these qualifications will not
prove important. Second, my use of the notion 'cognitive diversity' refers specifically to cases in
which people's  intuitions  vary with respect  to  demographic  factors  --  such as  their  culture,
socio-economic status, and gender. This differs in important ways from the notion of 'cognitive
diversity' popularised by Stephen Stich (1988), which refers more broadly to cases in which
people's  cognitive processes differ as a result of influences from environmental variables. On
Stich's conception, 'cognitive diversity' may refer to instances in which people's intuitions vary
with  respect  to  demographic  factors;  but  it  also  refers  to  variation  in  cognitive  processes
unrelated  to  intuitions,  as  a  result  of  influences  from environmental  variables  that  are  not
correlated to demographic variables. Moreover, the notion of 'cognitive diversity' adopted here
differs from the psychological notion of individual differences (see, e.g., Stanovich and West,
2000).  The  latter  refers  to  personal-level  factors  such as  intelligence and working  memory
capacity, which can give rise to differences in people's responses to cognitive tasks. I set aside
such  personal-level  factors  and  focus  entirely  on  differences  in  intuitions  correlated  with
demographic variables.  With  these  considerations  in  mind,  let  us  now  turn  to  the
methodological challenge I will be examining in this paper.
 2. The Challenge from Cognitive Diversity
To begin, consider the following case:
Unwavering:  An essential  part  of  a  philosopher  S's  argument  for  her  preferred
epistemological thesis is that many of her interlocutors share her intuition (i.e., her
judgement) about what is the correct verdict to a prominent philosophical case T.
However, empirical findings show that people from different cultures tend to have
a  diverging intuition with respect  to T; moreover, it  is  clear that  their intuition
supports  a  rival  epistemological  thesis.  S  acknowledges  this  set  of  diverging
intuitions; yet, she claims that because her intuition is  self-evidently correct, and
that other people from her cultural group agree, then there is good reason to favour
her thesis.
Most people agree that something is amiss with S's appeal to her intuitive judgement about T in
support of her thesis. After all, whether one finds S's intuition to be self-evidently correct seems
to depend on whether one belongs to her cultural group. But it is not clear why belonging to S's
culture puts one in a privileged epistemic position to judge on philosophical matters. And so, to
the extent that features of S's demography appear to determine whether she finds her intuition to
be self-evidently correct, her intuition fails to lend support to her preferred thesis.
4  I will use the notions of 'philosophical thought-experiment' and 'philosophical case' interchangeably
in what follows. However, not much hangs on this choice.
5  For a review, see Pust (2017, sec.1).
Some  have  argued  that  this  verdict  about  Unwavering applies  to  other  instances  in  which
intuitions vary along demographic lines. The following passages are representative of this line
of thought:
The  fact  that  epistemic  intuitions  vary  systematically  with  culture  and  [socio-
economic status] indicates that these intuitions are caused (in part) by culturally
local  phenomena.  And  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  the  culturally  local
phenomena that cause our intuitions track the truth any better than the culturally
local  phenomena  that  cause  intuitions  that  differ  from  ours.
(Nichols et al., 2003, p.234)
Intuitions track more than just the philosophically-relevant content of the thought-
experiments;  they  track  factors  that  are  irrelevant  to  the  issues  the  thought-
experiments attempt to address. The particular socio-economic status and cultural
background of a person who considers a thought-experiment should be irrelevant to
whether  or  not  that  thought-experiment  presents  a  case  of  knowledge.  Such
sensitivity  to  irrelevant  factors  undermines  intuitions’  status  as  evidence.
(Swain et al., 2008, pp.140–141)
If  I  find  out  that  my  philosophical  intuitions  are  a  product  of  my  cultural
upbringing,  then,  since  it's  in  some  sense  an  accident  that  I  had  the  cultural
upbringing that I did, I am forced to wonder whether my intuitions are superior at
tracking  the  nature  of  the  world,  the  mind,  and  the  good.
(Knobe and Nichols, 2008, p.11)
[T]he finding of cultural or individual differences in philosophical intuition makes
the  assumption that  "our"  intuitions  are  very likely to  be  true more  than  a  bit
problematic
(Stich and Tobia, 2016, p.13)
The common idea running through these passages is that it  is  epistemically questionable to
favour the intuitions of any particular demographic group. Building on these and other similar
kinds of considerations, some have argued that from the observation that intuitions vary along
demographic  lines,  we  can  infer  that  they  are  thereby  unsuited  to  play  evidential  roles  in
philosophy  (for  reviews:  Alexander  and  Weinberg,  2007;  Stich  and  Tobia,  2016).  I  have
denominated this the Challenge from Cognitive Diversity (CCD).
The CCD has attracted much attention in recent years, in great part due to a host of surprising
empirical findings suggesting that philosophical intuitions vary along demographic lines. One
prominent  example comes from studies reporting cross-cultural  variation in intuitions  about
versions of  Kripke's  famous Gödel  case  (for a  review: Dongen et  al.,  2020).  These studies
suggest  that  while Westerners tend to issue a causal-historical  intuition to these cases,  East
Asians tend to have descriptivist intuitions instead. Another example is a recent study reporting
similar  patterns  of  cross-cultural  variation  in  intuitions  about  Frankfurt  cases  --  a  class  of
thought-experiments which purport to show that agents can be morally responsible for their
actions, even if they did not have the ability to do otherwise (Hannikainen et al., 2019). The
study in question provides evidence that, when compared to East Asians, Westerners are much
more likely to judge subjects in these cases as having control and as being blameworthy for
their actions. And additional studies have found patterns of demographic variation in a host of
other intuitions as well.6
The intuitions examined in many of these studies have famously played central evidential roles
in philosophical arguments. For example, intuitions about Gödel-style cases have traditionally
been taken as evidence against descriptivist theories of reference and in favour of the opposing
causal-historical  view.  And similarly,  intuitions  about  Frankfurt  cases  are  often  invoked as
evidence for or against positions within thorny debates about the nature of free will. However, if
the above findings of cross-cultural variation are correct, then, in line with the CCD, reliance on
these demography-specific intuitions in evidential  roles is  ultimately unwarranted (see,  e.g.,
Machery et al., 2004; Hannikainen et al., 2019). These claims thus suggest that philosophical
debates about semantic reference and free will stand in need of significant revisions in order to
eliminate appeals to those intuitions as evidence for the different positions on these issues.
Some have argued that these local restrictions on the use of intuitions raise significant concerns
about the methodology of philosophy (for reviews: Alexander and Weinberg, 2007; Stich and
Tobia,  2016;  Machery,  2017).  Proponents  of  this  'restrictionist  project'  claim  that  the
methodology of philosophy relies heavily on appeal to intuitions in evidential roles. Moreover,
they contend that since some intuitions have been found to vary with respect to epistemically
irrelevant factors (such as demographic variables), then other yet untested intuitions might also
be prone to such worrying patterns of variation. On this note, they maintain that it would be
methodologically prudent  to reorient  philosophical inquiry away from relying so heavily on
intuitions as evidence -- at least until we have a better understanding of the extent to which they
are prone to such distorting effects.7
The  above  considerations  accentuate  the  potentially  radical  implications  of  upcoming
international  studies  testing  for  demographic  variation  in  intuitions.  For,  if  these  studies
discover demographic differences in  other important philosophical intuitions, then this would
substantiate  the  aforementioned  concerns  about  the  methodology  of  philosophy.  This
underscores the urgency of conducting a careful examination of the merits and shortcomings of
the CCD in order to better assess the real import of findings from the upcoming international
studies. This will be the aim in the subsequent sections. As a first step to carrying out such an
examination,  in  the  next  section  I  tease  apart  two  importantly  different  approaches  for
motivating the CCD.
 3. A Closer Look at the CCD
Concerns  about  the  use  of  demography-specific  intuitions  as  evidence  in  philosophy  are
typically motivated by two (non-mutually exclusive) approaches.  The first  of these seeks to
establish  that  it  would  be  question-begging  to  rely  on  demography-specific  intuitions  in
evidential  roles.  The  second  develops  instead  the  claim  that  intuitions  (in  general)  are
epistemically deficient. Machery (2017) has recently offered what is perhaps the most detailed
and robust defence of both these approaches. His arguments are a good point of departure for an
examination of the CCD as they helpfully pinpoint the epistemic considerations driving this
challenge. Focusing on these arguments will allow us to distinguish three formulations of the
CCD -- which I assess in turn in subsequent sections.
6  For a more comprehensive list of studies, see Machery (2017 ch. 2)
7  An  important  debate  among  restrictionists  is  whether  further  investigation  will  rehabilitate  the
evidentiary status of intuitions (see Machery, 2017, pp.7–8).
Two important  considerations  about  the  discussion that  follows.  First,  it  is  noteworthy that
Machery explicitly avoids using the term 'intuition', opting instead to frame his arguments in
terms of 'judgments about philosophical cases'. However, as mentioned in the outset (sec. 1), I
use 'intuition' to refer to precisely these kinds of judgments. And so, I will use 'intuition' and
'judgment about philosophical cases' interchangeably in what follows. Second, Machery aptly
distinguishes between material and formal uses of philosophical cases. Material uses aim to
improve our understanding of the referent of a philosophically-relevant concept or notion. We
have already discussed examples of material uses in the previous section: both the use of Gödel
cases to explore the nature of semantic reference and the use of Frankfurt cases to discover the
nature of free will configure material uses of philosophical cases. Formal uses, on the other
hand,  aim  to  investigate  the  content  of  philosophically-relevant  concepts.  For  the  sake  of
simplicity, I focus only on formulations of the CCD that attack material uses of philosophical
cases.8
CCD and Dogmatism
The  claim  that  it  would  be  question-begging  to  rely  on  demography-specific  intuitions  in
evidential  roles  has  proven  enormously  influential  in  debates  about  the  methodology  of
philosophy. And although many versions of this view are plausible in their own right, 9 Machery
(2017 ch. 4.1) helpfully draws on lessons and insights from debates about the epistemology of
peer disagreement to develop this view in more detail. His argument starts by pointing out that a
common position in debates about peer disagreement is that in at least  some cases, epistemic
peers ought to suspend judgments on a matter they dispute (Machery, 2017, p.135). The cases in
question are ones in which there is no reason to think that any of the peers is in a privileged
epistemic standing on that matter, and neither is there a clear-cut method to adjudicate on the
dispute at issue. Machery contends that disagreements about philosophical cases are structurally
similar to such cases of peer disagreement -- as there is presumably no good reason to think that
any group of people is in a privileged epistemic position to judge on philosophical matters, and
neither  are  there  adequate  resources  to  adjudicate  between  competing  intuitions  (Machery,
2017,  pp.130–136).  Thus,  he  proposes  that  one  ought  to  suspend  judgment  about  a  given
philosophical case if it is found to elicit disagreement.
Furthermore, Machery argues that since most intuitions studied so far elicit disagreements (e.g.,
between different demographic groups), then we should expect other intuitions to also elicit
disagreements. Moreover, he indicates that the kinds of epistemic concerns arising for cases of
peer disagreement extend to these merely potential cases of disagreements in judgments about
philosophical cases (Machery, 2017, pp.127–130). In this sense, he argues as follows (Machery,
2017, p.127):
Dogmatism
1. Most of the philosophical cases examined by experimental philosophers elicit
disagreement.
2. This disagreement takes place among epistemic peers.
8  Although I  do not  have  space  to  develop  this  here,  the  arguments  in  this  paper  apply,  mutatis
mutandis,  to formulations of the CCD in terms of arguments against  formal uses of philosophical
cases.
9  See, for example, Stich (1988).
3. If most of the philosophical cases examined by experimental philosophers elicit
disagreement among peers, then most philosophical cases would plausibly elicit
disagreement among peers.
4. If epistemic peers are likely to disagree about a philosophical case, they ought to
suspend judgment about it.
5. Hence, except for those philosophical cases known not to elicit disagreement
among  peers,  philosophers  ought  to  suspend  judgment  about  the  situations
described by philosophical cases
Note that Dogmatism articulates a version of the CCD. For, as Machery suggests, we should
regard  cases  of  cognitive  diversity  as  instances  of  peer  disagreement.  And so,  evidence  of
cognitive diversity in judgments about a given philosophical case motivates suspension of such
judgments. Now consider: if philosophers ought to suspend a judgment about a philosophical
case, then it is hard to see what justifies appealing to it as evidence for philosophical claims.
Thus,  Dogmatism infers  from evidence that  intuitions  vary along demographic  lines  to  the
conclusion  that  they  are  unsuited  to  play  evidential  roles.  However,  it  is  noteworthy  that
Dogmatism conflates distinct ways of motivating this conclusion. As we will see below, teasing
these apart proves important for an adequate assessment of the CCD.
A  central  insight  from  research  on  cases  of  peer  disagreement  is  that  they  can  motivate
suspension of judgment for two distinct reasons (Schoenfield, 2014; Christensen, 2016). The
first  is  that  learning  about  the  disagreement  raises  the  hypothesis  that  the  judgments  are
irrational; the second is that this raises the hypothesis that the judgments are false. Typically,
these hypotheses are run together. But note that in at least some cases, these two dimensions of
evaluation can come apart. (For example, one could attempt to solve math problems by just
guessing the answer, which is an irrational method, but which can sometimes deliver the right
result.)
These considerations help give a plausible diagnosis of why cases of cognitive diversity can
motivate  suspension  of  judgment  in  the  way  Machery  suggests.  First,  learning  of  such
disagreements raises the hypothesis that  one's  intuition is  likely to be irrational.10 After  all,
demographic  factors  are  presumably  epistemically  irrelevant  with  respect  to  philosophical
truths. Thus, learning of the influence of demographic factors suggests that one's intuitions may
not be adequately responsive to the available evidence on the matter under dispute. And note
that this threat of irrationality persists even if the intuition is veridical -- as one could have just
been lucky to have belonged to the demographic group with the correct intuitions without ever
having considered one's reasons for them. Furthermore, evidence of cognitive diversity raises
the hypothesis  that  one's  intuition is  likely to  be false.  After  all,  it  is  implausible  that  two
demographic groups which disagree in their judgments about philosophical matters can both be
right. Therefore, learning about the disagreement with another demographic group suggests that
one's intuition has a roughly even chance of being correct or incorrect.
This shows that there are two ways of motivating premise 4 of Dogmatism. The first is driven
by the idea that evidence of cognitive diversity raises the hypothesis that one's intuition is likely
to be irrational. This would in turn motivate suspension of judgment -- as, presumably, one
should suspend judgment when this is likely to be irrational. Assuming that Machery is right
that  concerns  arising  for  cases  of  peer  disagreement  extend  to  merely  potential cases  of
10  Although  some have  denied  that  intuitions  can  be  evaluated  along  the  dimension  of  epistemic
rationality (e.g., Koksvik, Forthcoming ch.2).
disagreement  in  judgments  about  philosophical  cases,  we  arrive  at  the  following  way  of
motivating premise 4:
Irrationality
4a.  If  epistemic  peers  disagree about  a  philosophical  case,  their  judgments  are
likely to be irrational.
4b. One ought to suspend judgment if it is likely to be irrational.
4c. Epistemic concerns arising for confirmed cases of peer disagreement arise also
for potential disagreements in judgments about philosophical cases.
4. If epistemic peers are likely to disagree about a philosophical case, they ought to
suspend judgment about it.
The second way of motivating premise 4 is driven, instead, by the threat of falsity:
Falsity
4a.  If  epistemic  peers  disagree about  a  philosophical  case,  their  judgments  are
likely to be false.
4b. One ought to suspend judgment if it is likely to be false.
4c. Epistemic concerns arising for confirmed cases of peer disagreement arise also
for potential disagreements in judgments about philosophical cases.
4. If epistemic peers are likely to disagree about a philosophical case, they ought to
suspend judgment about it.
Differentiating Falsity and Irrationality show how Dogmatism articulates two distinct versions
of the CCD. If this argument is fleshed out in terms of Irrationality, then demography-specific
intuitions are unsuited to play evidential roles because they are likely to be irrational. If fleshed
out in terms of Falsity, intuitions are so unsuited because they are likely to be false.
CCD and Unreliability
Another way to motivate concerns about use of demography-specific intuitions in philosophy is
to claim that intuitions (in general) are epistemically deficient. On some prominent formulations
of this view, this is because intuitions are hopeless (Weinberg, 2007), problematically sensitive
(Alexander and Weinberg, 2014), or because they are difficult to calibrate (Cummins, 1998).
Despite the influence of these proposals in recent years, many have pointed out that requiring
epistemic sources  to  be well-calibrated,  hopeful,  or  adequately sensitive  impugns  epistemic
sources that are generally considered to be sound (see, e.g., Weinberg et al., 2012; Brown, 2013;
Machery, 2017, p.104). In light of these and other similar kinds of critiques, Machery argues for
the  alternative  claim  that  intuitions  are  epistemically  deficient  because  they  are  unreliable
(Machery,  2017,  pp.102–105).  Machery's  argument  focuses  on  the  notion  of  aggregate
reliability (Machery, 2017, p.104). On this dimension of evaluation, reliability is determined
(roughly) as a function of the likelihood that an intuition chosen at random is correct. Machery's
proposal is that intuitions are unreliable in this sense, as demonstrated by two extant bodies of
empirical  findings.  The  first  are  findings  of  cognitive  diversity,  which  suggest  that  large
demographic groups have diverging intuitions; and the second are findings of presentational
effects, which suggest that people's intuitions vary depending on how thought-experiments are
presented to them -- such as their order, or  superficial  changes in the wording. 11 Machery's
suggestion is that these findings demonstrate that for any given thought-experiment, roughly
half of all people will have one intuition, whereas the other half will have another (Machery,
2017, p.105). And assuming that two diverging intuitions cannot both be correct, then for any
intuition  chosen  at  random,  it  will  have  a  roughly  even  chance  of  being  either  correct  or
incorrect -- thus making it unreliable.
Furthermore, Machery argues that since most intuitions studied to date have been prone to large
demographic and/or presentational effects, then we should expect other intuitions to also vary
depending on such factors -- and to thus also be unreliable. In this sense, he argues as follows
(Machery, 2017, pp.102–103):
Unreliability
1. Unreliable judgments are severely deficient from an epistemic point of view.
2. Judgments elicited by most of the philosophical cases that have been examined
by experimental philosophers are unreliable.
3.  If  the  judgments  elicited  by most  of  the  philosophical  cases  that  have  been
examined by experimental philosophers are unreliable, then the judgments elicited
by most philosophical cases are plausibly unreliable.
4. We ought to refrain from making a judgment of a particular kind K (i.e., we
ought  to  suspend  judgment  of  kind  K)  when  most  judgments  of  this  kind  are
plausibly severely deficient  from an epistemic point  of  view,  except  when this
judgment is known to be an exception.
5. Hence, except when a philosophical case is known to elicit a reliable judgment,
philosophers  ought  to  suspend  judgment  about  the  situations  described  by
philosophical cases.
Unreliability also articulates a version of the CCD. As discussed above, the main justification
for premise 2 is the claim that an intuition is unreliable provided that it is prone to either large
demographic or presentational effects. This entails that evidence of large demographic effects
suffices  to  show  an  intuition  to  be  unreliable.  Moreover,  according  to  premise  1,  such
demography-specific intuitions are severely deficient from an epistemic point of view. And, in
line with premise 4, this means we should refrain from making judgements about philosophical
cases when these are prone to such large demographic effects.  Now, if philosophers should
refrain  from  making  demography-specific  judgments  about  philosophical  cases  in  the  first
place, then it is hard to see what justifies their use as evidence in philosophy. Thus, when taken
together, premises 1, 2 and 4 of Unreliability formulate a version of the CCD that is driven by
the claim that intuitions prone to large demographic effects are unreliable.
11  For a review of the empirical evidence, see Machery (2017 ch. 2)
Summing up
To  take  stock,  I  have  given  a  brief  overview  of  Machery's  arguments  for  the  two  most
prominent approaches for motivating methodological concerns about the use of demography-
specific intuitions in evidential roles. I then showed how these arguments allow us to distinguish
three versions of the CCD. The first builds on the idea that demography-specific intuitions are
likely to  be irrational,  whereas  the  second is  driven by the claim that  demography-specific
intuitions are likely to be false. The third version of the CCD relies instead on the idea that
evidence of large demographic effects on intuitions shows them to be unreliable.
In the subsequent sections, I provide reasons to reject all such formulations of the CCD. My
arguments will seek to establish that, in at least some cases, even if intuitions are found to vary
along demographic lines (and even if the demographic effects are large) this still fails to raise
worries that they are irrational, false, or unreliable. As a first step to establishing this proposal,
in the next section I argue against the claim that evidence of demographic variation suffices to
show that intuitions are likely to be irrational.
Before  proceeding,  one  important  caveat.  I  will  assume  here  that  people  from  different
demographic groups are epistemic peers with respect to philosophical matters. Now, many have
contested this claim (e.g., Grundmann, 2013). However, for the sake of argument, I will dismiss
such considerations here.
 4. Against Irrationality
In this section, I argue against the first premise of Irrationality -- i.e., the claim that if epistemic
peers disagree about a philosophical case, then their judgments are likely to be irrational. I first
briefly rehearse the motivations for the view known as 'permissivism',  according to which a
body of evidence can rationalise more than one doxastic attitude. I then pose a dilemma for
proponents of Irrationality: they must either deny permissivism, or establish that no case of
cognitive diversity is permissive. As we will see, the first option is untenable and the second
option is false (as there is good reason to think that at least some instances of cognitive diversity
are indeed permissive).
Permissivism
As already mentioned, permissivism states that a body of evidence can rationalise more than
one doxastic attitude. Permissivists often seek to motivate this view by appealing to cases. For
instance, Gideon Rosen offers the following example:
Palaeontologists disagree about what killed the dinosaurs. And while it is possible
that most of the parties to this dispute are irrational, this need not be the case. To
the contrary, it would appear to be a fact of epistemic life that a careful review of
the evidence does not guarantee consensus even among thoughtful and otherwise
rational  investigators.
(Rosen, 2001, p.71)
Permissivists  take other examples  of disagreements  in the  sciences,  law, and philosophy to
motivate a similar conclusion: people can rationally hold diverging positions about what a body
of  evidence supports.  For  a  further  illustration,  consider  the  thorny debates  between David
Lewis and Robert Stalnaker (and between their respective students) on the notion of a 'possible
world'.  Even though Stalnaker and Lewis disagree, it is still plausible to think that  both are
rational in their respective positions on this issue.
To buttress this proposal, permissivists argue that what is rational to believe depends in great
part  on what  methods are  used to  analyse the available  evidence (see,  e.g.,  Douven,  2009;
Titelbaum and Kopec, 2019). Such methods are distinguished (at least in part) by how they
balance  certain  theoretical  virtues  against  each  other  --  things  like  explanatory  power,
coherence, fruitfulness, and simplicity. So a method that favours the virtue of simplicity over
that of coherence will thus differ from one which prioritises coherence over all other virtues.
Now, given that  distinct weightings of such theoretical  virtues can be equally rational,  then
there can be distinct yet equally rational methods for analysing a body of evidence.
These considerations help to clarify why the cases discussed above are plausibly permissive.
For example, consider two of the major theories in debates about what killed the dinosaurs: (i)
the impact theory -- according to which this is explained by the impact of an asteroid on Earth --
and (ii) the volcanic theory -- which explains this event as resulting from an increase in volcanic
activity at the time. These theories differ, in part, because they favour distinct theoretical virtues
(see, e.g., Officer and Page, 1996 Afterword). Proponents of the volcanic theory claim that their
view is explanatorily powerful,  insofar as it  accommodates for a large number of disparate
geological findings. Proponents of the impact theory, on the other hand, claim that their view is
to be preferred,  in  part  because it  is  much more simple  (see,  e.g.,  Officer  and Page,  1996
Afterword). Now, since methods that favour simplicity over explanatory power, or  vice-versa,
can both be regarded as rational,  then proponents of these different theories are presumably
rational in their respective views -- even if they deliver different outcomes. Similarly, we can
potentially  explain  the  disagreements  between Stalnaker  and Lewis  regarding the notion  of
'possible worlds' as originating from differences on which theoretical virtues they consider more
desirable  --  e.g.,  with Lewis favouring coherence more than what  is  commonsensical  when
compared to Stalnaker. Given the methods each of them employs is equally rational, then their
respective positions are presumably rational as well.
Permissivism in Cognitive Diversity
So far I have rehearsed reasons for thinking people can sometimes be rational in their diverging
positions about  some matter  under dispute.  How about cases in which people from distinct
demographic groups have opposite intuitions about a philosophical thought-experiment? Could
those disagreements also be permissive? If so, this would pose a challenge for the first premise
of Irrationality -- i.e., the claim that if epistemic peers disagree about a philosophical case, their
judgments are likely to be irrational. After all, if people from different demographic groups who
are  indeed  epistemic  peers  have  diverging  intuitions,  and  if  they  are  all  rational  in  their
respective intuitions, there is no reason to think of their intuitions as irrational. I can see two
lines of response available to a proponent of Irrationality here:
(1) Deny permissivism outright -- i.e., to defend the position commonly known as
'Uniqueness'; or
(2) Accept  that  there  are  permissive  cases,  but  contend  that  the  cases  of
demographic variation in intuitions about thought-experiments do not admit of more
than one rational doxastic attitude.
Consider the first option. Denying there could be any permissive cases precludes the possibility
of permissive disagreements in philosophy (including those uncovered by evidence of cognitive
diversity). This then undercuts the challenge to Irrationality from permissivism.
I contend that proponents of Irrationality should reject this first option. Uniqueness is highly
controversial insofar as it forces us to conceive of evidential support in terms of a two-place
epistemic relation, which takes a body of evidence E as one of the relata and a proposition p as
the other (see, e.g., Kelly, 2013; Titelbaum and Kopec, 2019). On this view, to evaluate whether
E evidentially supports p, we need only define E and p -- nothing else needs to be factored in.
But, as many have taken pains to show, conceiving of facts of evidential support in terms of this
two-place  relation  is  simply  untenable  (Douven,  2009;  Kelly,  2013;  Titelbaum and Kopec,
2019). The problem is familiar from debates about the shortcomings of objective (or formal)
confirmation  theories  (which  claim  that  the  bearing  of  evidence  on  a  belief  is  completely
independent of any subjective elements). Two prominent examples of such views are Carnap's
system of "inductive logic" and Hempel's positive instance account for defining confirmation
relations in exclusively logical  terms.  Carnap's  system famously failed because it  could not
specify non-arbitrary ways to  assign unique logical  probabilities  to  hypotheses,  and neither
could it disqualify absurd probability assignments. And Hempel's view failed to capture some
even  trivial  cases  like  theoretical  hypothesis,  as  well  as  other  more  tricky  cases  such  as
Goodman's case of "grue" and the ravens paradox. As some have pointed out, many of these
problems  also  arise  for  Uniqueness.  For  example,  Titelbaum  (2010)  demonstrates  that  the
challenge posed by Goodman's "grue" case generalises for any view that conceives of evidential
support in the way that Uniqueness does. And Schoenfield (2014, pp.197–198) points out that
such views fail  to specify a non-arbitrary and non-mysterious way of specifying degrees of
evidential support. Delving into the finer details of these proposals is outside the scope of this
paper. However, these considerations suffice to show that tying up Irrationality to Uniqueness
would make this argument prone to such forceful objections -- causing it to significantly lose its
bite.
The second option is far more promising. Even if we admit some disagreements are permissive,
this does not entail that  every case of peer disagreement is permissive. And, plausibly, those
disagreements  uncovered  by  findings  of  cognitive  diversity  belong  to  the  class  of  non-
permissive  ones.  For,  unlike  the  disagreements  between  the  Palaeontologists  or  the  expert
philosophers, which turn on parties having distinct yet equally rational methods, divergences
uncovered by cases of cognitive diversity seem to turn on  nothing more than features of the
demography of the disagreeing parties.
Although seemingly  plausible,  this  line  of  reply  fails.  Even if  we  can  trace  disagreements
between peers to demographic factors, this need not indicate irrationality on the part of those
involved in the dispute. As we will see, some such cases of disagreement along demographic
lines resemble the permissive cases of peer disagreement detailed above insofar as they can be
explained as the result of parties (inadvertently) adopting distinct yet equally rational methods
to analyse a body of evidence.
As a first step to developing this claim, consider the challenge posed by the so-called threshold
problem for knowledge -- i.e., the question of how strong a subject's epistemic position must be
for them to be ascribed knowledge. As many have suggested, solutions to the threshold problem
can be thought in terms of a trade-off between two opposing epistemic imperatives: first, the
imperative of error-avoidance, and second, that of learning truths (Foley, 1992). On this view, if
the threshold of knowledge is set very high, then agents must be in a strong epistemic position
to be attributed knowledge. We can think of this as a case in which the imperative of error-
avoidance is prioritised over that of learning truths. By contrast, solutions that require agents to
be in a weaker epistemic position to be attributed knowledge will prioritise the imperative of
learning truths over that of avoiding error.
Framing the threshold problem in this way helps elucidate how distinct communities could set
different thresholds for knowledge yet still be rational. For example, consider a community C1
that  is  overall  very  risk-averse  as  a  result  of  living  in  a  very  hostile  environment  (where
conditions are dire, resources are scarce, and mistakes can easily lead to substantial harms).
Accordingly, members of C1 perceive the cost of acquiring false beliefs to be very high. And so
they strongly prioritise the epistemic imperative of error-avoidance over that of learning truths.
We can thus expect members of C1 to set the threshold for knowledge somewhat high. Now
consider a community C2 living in more agreeable environmental conditions. As a function of
their favourable conditions, members of C2 prioritise the imperative of learning truths over that
of error-avoidance. Thus, they perceive the cost of acquiring false beliefs as rather low, and are
comfortable taking risks (to, e.g., explore their surroundings). Members of C2 then set a lower
threshold for knowledge (when compared to C1), attributing knowledge to subjects who stand
in weaker epistemic positions.
Given the scenario described above,  it  is  safe  to  assume that  members  of  C1 and C2 will
sometimes diverge in their knowledge attributions -- even in response to philosophical thought-
experiments. For instance, suppose members of each community considered the following case:
Case  A:  While  preparing  lunch,  Stefano  grabs  a  tin  of  chickpeas  from  the
cupboard. He looks at the tin and asserts: "I know there are chickpeas in this tin."
Case  B:  While  preparing  lunch,  Stefano  grabs  a  tin  of  chickpeas  from  the
cupboard. He looks at the tin and wonders whether it is possible that foreign spies
could have broken into his home in the night and substituted its contents with small
stones that weigh just as much as chickpeas. Stefano considers this possibility and
asserts: "I know there are chickpeas in this tin."
Suppose the more risk-tolerant members of C2 have the intuition that Stefano speaks truly in
both cases. They agree that in both A and B Stefano does know there are chickpeas in the tin.
However,  the  highly  risk-averse  members  of  C1  could  disagree.  Because  of  their  extreme
sensitivity to possibilities of error, they could have the intuition that Stefano does not know that
there  are  chickpeas  in  the  tin  after  raising  the  consideration  that  foreign  spies  could  have
substituted the contents of the tin with stones. Now, note that if such divergences in intuitions
arise, they will be due to influences of demographic factors. After all, these intuitions will differ
at least in part as a function of the different threshold for knowledge set by each community.
Now, according to the first premise of Irrationality, if the divergence in intuitive knowledge
attributions we find between members of C1 and C2 is a case of cognitive diversity, then it
should immediately raise the hypothesis that their intuitions are likely to be irrational. However,
I propose that  we should resist  this  verdict  as,  plausibly,  members of C1 and C2 would be
rational in their respective (differing) intuitions about knowledge. After all, each community's
trade-off between the badness of acquiring bad beliefs in opposition to the relative advantage of
coming to hold true beliefs is adequately responsive to the kinds of constraints imposed by each
of their environments. And in this sense, we can regard their respective methods for evaluating
knowledge attributions -- that is, the function they apply to draw conclusions about knowledge
attributions from a given body of evidence -- to be equally rational. The divergences in intuitive
knowledge  attributions  between  members  of  C1  and  C2  therefore  resemble  the  kind  of
permissive cases of peer disagreement between Palaeontologists and expert philosophers.
There  is  an objection in  the  offing that  is  worth addressing here.  Wouldn't  learning of  the
dispute suffice to raise doubts about the methods themselves? Maybe members of C2 should re-
evaluate how they set the threshold for knowledge after discovering that members from C1 have
such a lower threshold. Likewise, maybe members of C1 should reconsider their own threshold
for knowledge once learning of the differing standards endorsed by members of C2.
The above objection is a serious one. My response to it is, however, simple: as this objection
poses  a  challenge  for  permissivism  in  general,  I  see  no  way  of  pressing  it  without  being
committed to Uniqueness. To clarify, note how the above challenge can be raised for any case
peer disagreement whatsoever. On the above line of reply, the  mere fact of the disagreement
between two subjects  S1  and  S2  on  some undefined  matter  suffices  to  raise  the  threat  of
irrationality about the methods each of them employs. If this is correct, peer disagreement will
never be permissive. Otherwise put, pressing this challenge would commit one to Uniqueness
(or  at  least  some  version  of  this  view).  As  I  have  given  reasons  to  think  this  option  is
unattractive, I suggest this line of reply is problematic.
At this point, it is important to pause and clarify the dialectical purpose of the discussion in this
section.  Importantly,  I  am  not  defending  that  every case  of  cognitive  diversity  is  thus
permissive; rather,  I only indicate in which ways they can be considered permissive. In the
remainder of this section, I show how these considerations are suggestive for thinking that some
prominent cases of cognitive diversity are plausibly permissive.
As already discussed, a prominent set of empirical findings suggest that while Westerners have
causal-historical  intuitions  about  Gödel-style  cases,  East  Asians  have descriptivist  intuitions
instead (see Dongen et al.,  2020). One plausible explanation for this divergence is that East
Asians and Westerners employ different reference-fixing strategies to make judgments about the
referent  in  this  case.  Thus,  whereas  East  Asians  judge  that  'Gödel'  refers  to  whoever  best
satisfies  a  particular  description  D  (or  clusters  of  descriptions)  associated  with  this  name,
Westerners judge that 'Gödel' refers to whoever was given that name in some initial 'baptism'.
Now,  is  there  reason  to  think  that  adopting  either  of  these  reference-fixing  strategies  is
irrational? This is questionable. One reason for thinking as much comes from recent evidence
suggesting that people will rely on  both causal-historical and descriptivist strategies to make
judgments about semantic reference -- choosing one or another depending on which term is
being analysed (Nichols et al.,  2016). And, as Nichols et al.  (2016, pp.160–162) suggest,  it
would  be  implausible  to  take  this  variation  in  the  use  of  such  strategies  as  indication  of
irrationality on the part of speaker/hearers. Instead, it seems plausible that using either of these
different strategies is appropriate as they both deliver correct results (depending on the term
being  analysed).  This  then  suggests  that  both  these  strategies  are  rational methods  for
determining semantic reference. Thus, although East Asians and Westerners may make use of
different reference-fixing strategies to attribute meaning in Gödel cases, both such strategies can
be considered to be rational -- and that the disagreement in question is plausibly permissive.12
For  another  illustration  of  a  plausibly  permissive  case  of  cognitive  diversity,  consider  the
findings that Westerns are more likely than East Asians to judge that the subject of a Frankfurt
case is blameworthy for their actions (Hannikainen et al., 2019). As the authors of this study
12  It is of course possible that one or another of these strategies may actually deliver the wrong result in
the Gödel case. Even so, both such strategies are still plausibly rational -- since even rational methods
can (on occasion) lead to the formation of false beliefs.
suggest, one plausible explanation for this variation is that East Asians and Westerners tend to
adopt  different  strategies  to  explain  human  behaviour.  Whereas  East  Asians  often  rely  on
situationist explanations -- which emphasises how social roles, obligations, and other features of
a  person's  situation --  Westerners  rely instead on dispositionist  explanations --  which focus
instead on people's internal characteristics, such as their desires and personality. Now, is there
reason to think that adopting either of these strategies to explain human behaviour is irrational?
This  also  seems  questionable.  After  all,  both  approaches  can  presumably  deliver  plausible
interpretations of human behaviour, as it seems clear that situationist and dispositionist factors
can bear on our actions. So, although focusing more on one or another of these factors can
deliver different results, it is unclear why this is evidence that adopting one or another of these
strategies is irrational.13 In this sense, the disagreement found in intuitions of East Asians and
Westerners  about  Frankfurt  cases  can  presumably  be  traced  back  to  distinct,  but  similarly
rational methods for analysing human behaviour. As such, the dispute at issue is plausibly a
permissive one.
In sum, the arguments in this section show that evidence of cognitive diversity cannot  itself
raise the threat of irrationality about diverging intuitions. In this way, the above examples give
us reasons to resist  the first  premise of Irrationality -- i.e.,  the claim that if epistemic peers
disagree about a philosophical case, their judgments are likely to be irrational. As such, there is
good reason to reject versions of the CCD that rely on Irrationality.
 5. Against Falsity and Unreliability
In this section, I begin by arguing against the first premise of Falsity -- i.e., the claim that if
epistemic peers disagree about a philosophical case, then their judgments are likely to be false. I
show how recent findings from the burgeoning Sources Project in experimental philosophy give
us  reason  to  reject  this  claim  insofar  as  they  provide  resources  to  adjudicate  between
demography-specific intuitions. I then build on these considerations to argue against yet another
formulation of the CCD: namely, that which relies on the claim that intuitions prone to large
demographic effects are unreliable (sec. 5.2).
On Falsity
The Sources Project in experimental philosophy aims to provide psychological explanations of
intuitions that can help assess their epistemic standing (Pust, 2017). For the most part, studies in
the  Sources  Project  develop  this  approach  by  first  tracing  intuitions  back  to  particular
psychological  processes.  They then examine under which circumstances these processes are
trustworthy, and when they can lead judgments astray.14 Findings from this research programme
are instructive insofar as they allow philosophers to make better informed assessments of when
they can rely on their intuitions and when they should refrain from doing so. Notably, a set of
studies in the Sources Project has examined intuitions at the centre of recent debates about the
CCD. And, as we will see below, their findings prove relevant to evaluate Falsity.
13  This is not to say that dispositionist and situationist strategies  always deliver apt  explanations of
human  behaviour.  Indeed,  reliance  on  some  such  strategies  can  lead  to  errors  under  certain
circumstances (for a review Malle, 2006). However, it's unclear why such errors should be taken as
indication that either such strategies are thereby wholly irrational.
14  For some recent examples of this approach see, e.g., Gerken and Beebe (2016) and Fischer et al.
(2020).
As a first example, consider the recent study by Izumi et al. (2018) on intuitions about Kripke's
Gödel-style cases. These cases ask people to evaluate whether the name `Gödel' -- as used in a
given scenario -- refers to either: (a) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of
arithmetic; or (b) the person who stole the proof and claimed credit for the work. Izumi and
colleagues point out the many difficulties in providing a non-ambiguous translation of (a) and
(b) into East Asian languages. The problem is that both these options use the definite article 'the'
to pick out a specific person mentioned in the relevant scenario. However, East Asian languages
(e.g.,  Japanese and Cantonese) lack a definite  article that  plays this  syntactic role.  For  this
precise reason, versions of the Gödel case used in experimental studies tend to translate both (a)
and (b) as bare noun phrases that omit the definite article 'the' (Izumi et al., 2018). But as Izumi
and colleagues point out, such bare noun phrase translations of (a) and (b) into Japanese (and
other East Asian languages) are ambiguous between at least four different readings. Moreover,
they show that the natural disambiguation of these phrases yield wrong interpretations of the
Gödel cases. Thus, Izumi et al. argue that intuitions elicited by translated versions of Gödel-
style cases are likely to reflect misinterpretations of the scenario described -- a hypothesis which
they confirm in a set of experimental studies.
Results from this study have important implications for an evaluation of Falsity. In effect, they
indicate that recent findings of cross-cultural diversity in intuitions about Gödel cases are due to
a  performance  error.  Now,  if  descriptivist  intuitions  of  East  Asians  elicited  by  recent
experimental studies are likely to reflect misinterpretations, then it is unclear why their conflict
with causal-historical intuitions of North-Americans should raise worries that the latter are false.
So, even if diverging intuitions about the nature of semantic reference cannot both be right,
there is reason to prefer one set of intuitions over another. Of course, this is not to say that
semantic  reference  is  thereby  causal-historical.  Rather,  the  claim  is  that  mere  evidence
suggesting that causal-historical intuitions are demography-specific would not give rise to the
hypothesis  that  this  intuition  is  thereby  likely  to  be  false.  As  such,  these  considerations
effectively rebut the first premise of Falsity.
As a further example of how findings in the Sources Project  challenge the first  premise of
Falsity, consider recent work on the cognitive underpinnings of intuitions about free will. A
number of such studies suggest that compatibilist intuitions -- according to which free will is
compatible with determinism -- stem from the operation of epistemically questionable cognitive
processes.15 For example, one set of studies show that compatibilist intuitions can be traced back
to an inadvertent 'intrusion effect': a phenomenon in which people misinterpret the vignette of a
thought-experiment due to reliance on assumptions that contradict important features of that
vignette.  Consider  for  example  the  study  by  Nadelhoffer  et  al.  (2020).  In  a  series  of
experiments,  they  found  that  people  often  judge  that  deterministic  universes  are  outright
impossible, and that subjects in those universes could intervene to effect changes in the causal
chain leading up to their actions. In light of these findings, Nadelhoffer and colleagues conclude
that  people  often  (implicitly)  hold  indeterministic world-views.  Furthermore,  and  more
importantly, their findings also show a strong correlation between judgments that align with
such an indeterministic world-view and the tendency to issue compatibilist intuitions. On the
basis of these findings, they conclude that compatibilist intuitions are due to an intrusion effect:
people misinterpret scenarios describing deterministic universes because they import features of
their indeterministic world-view into their reading of those scenarios (for similar results: Rose et
al., 2017). In a similar vein, further studies also provide evidence that compatibilist intuitions
15  Murray  and  Nahmias  (2014)  argue  for  the  thesis  that  incompatibilist  intuitions  also  stem from
epistemically deficient psychological processes. However, see Rose and Nichols (2013) for a reply.
stem from the  operations  of  other  epistemically  questionable  cognitive  processes  (see,  e.g.,
Clark et al., 2019; Feltz and Millan, 2015).
These findings also have important implications for an evaluation of Falsity. In effect, these
findings suggest that even if intuitions about free will vary along demographic lines -- such that
some  demographic  group  has  compatibilist  intuitions,  whereas  another  has  incompatibilist
intuitions -- this would not show that incompatibilist intuitions are thereby likely to be false.
After  all,  the  findings  above  indicate  that  compatibilist  intuitions  stem  from  epistemically
questionable cognitive processes. And so, it is unclear why their conflict with incompatibilist
intuitions suffices to raise the hypothesis that the latter is false.
At this juncture, it is important to pause and elucidate the dialectical purposes of the discussion
above. The arguments in this section provide examples of how evidence that an intuition is
demography-specific  need not indicate that  it  is  thereby likely to be false.  Through a more
detailed understanding of the psychological processes that give rise to different intuitions, we
can adjudicate between demography-specific intuitions. Now, this is not to say that findings of
cognitive diversity  never give rise to the threat of falsity. After all,  without a more detailed
understanding of the psychological processes driving conflicting intuitions in cases of cognitive
diversity,  there  would  be  a  lack  of  resources  to  make  such  a  better  informed  assessment.
However, in at least those cases where such resources are available, disagreements in intuitions
cutting across demographic lines need not give rise to concerns about falsity. Thus, attempts to
motivate the CCD via Falsity do not succeed.
On Unreliability
In  this  section,  I  argue  against  the  formulation  of  the  CCD which  builds  on  the  idea  that
demography-specific intuitions are unreliable, and so severely deficient from an epistemic point
of view. This version of the CCD focuses on the notion of  aggregate reliability, which takes
reliability to be (roughly) a function of how probable it is that an intuition chosen at random will
turn out  to  be  correct.  Intuitions  found prone to  large  demographic  effects  are  presumably
unreliable  on this  dimension of  evaluation.  After  all,  if  competing intuitions  about  a given
thought-experiment  are  evenly  distributed  among  large  demographic  groups,  then,  for  any
intuition chosen at random there is an even chance that it will be either correct or incorrect. My
main contention is that even if intuitions are found to have a low aggregate reliability, this does
not show them to be severely deficient from an epistemic point of view. To begin developing
this proposal, it is useful to start with an example of how low aggregate reliability does not
always seem to impugn the epistemic credentials of an epistemic source:
Microscope: A research lab receives two different shipments of microscopes from
a trusted supplier:  the first  is  of  100 units  of  a microscope of type A, and the
second is of 100 of microscopes of type B. When later put to use to check whether
a particular molecule is either round or oval, researchers observe differences in the
outputs of A- and B-microscopes. Whereas A-microscopes show the molecule as
round,  B-microscopes  show  it  as  oval.  The  lab  then  receives  news  from  the
supplier that microscopes of type B were produced with a new lens material that
was found to systematically produce distorted images of round objects.
Note that the aggregate reliability of the outputs of A- and B-microscopes will be low: only
50% of them will yield the right result on whether the molecule in question is round or oval.
Now, let's assume for the sake of argument that aggregate unreliability is sufficient to show that
an epistemic source is severely deficient from an epistemic point of view. On this view, the
evidence  about  the  operations  of  A-  and  B-microscopes  would  suggest  that  both are
epistemically deficient. However, this seems like the wrong result.  As stipulated in the case
above,  B-microscopes  were  found  to  systematically  deliver  wrong  results  --  consistently
showing round objects as oval. This information should suffice to show that conflicts in the
outputs  of  B-microscopes  and  A-microscopes  should  not  raise  doubts  about  the  epistemic
credentials of the latter.  And so, evaluating the epistemic credentials of A-microscopes as a
function of the aggregate reliability with B-microscopes seems unwarranted.
The arguments developed earlier in this section suggest  that  similar considerations apply to
epistemic evaluations of intuitions that are found prone to large demographic effects. For, as
those arguments show, psychological explanations of intuitions can provide reasons to favour
the intuitions of a particular demographic group when the intuitions of another demographic
group  are  found  to  stem  from  the  operations  of  epistemically  questionable  psychological
processes.  And  so,  as  in  the  case  of  the  microscopes  above,  even  if  the  intuitions  of  two
demographic groups conflict and are thus found to have a low aggregate reliability, this can fail
to show that each demography-specific intuition is equally deficient from an epistemic point of
view. To buttress this proposal, recall the findings suggesting that the descriptivist intuitions of
East  Asians  in  response to  Gödel  cases  are  likely  to  reflect  a  misunderstanding  caused  by
ambiguities  engendered  by  errors  of  translation  (sec.  5.1).  Now,  the  conflict  between  the
intuitions of East Asians and Westerners about Gödel cases means that the aggregate reliability
of these intuitions will be low (as both demographic groups are quite large). But, even if this is
the case, it is implausible to say that the causal-historical intuitions of North-Americans are
severely epistemically deficient in the same way as the descriptivist intuitions of East Asians.
And so, as in the case of the microscopes, evaluating the epistemic credentials of demography-
specific  causal-historical  intuitions  as  a  function  of  their  conflict  with  demography-specific
descriptivist intuitions seems unwarranted.
Similar  conclusions  can  be  drawn  about  potential findings  of  cross-cultural  variation  in
intuitions about free will. As detailed earlier in this section, there is robust empirical evidence
that compatibilist intuitions are likely to be mistaken -- insofar as they fail to track important
features of determinism (sec. 5.1). So, even if two demographic groups are found to diverge in
their intuitions about free will -- such that the aggregate reliability of their intuitions is low -- it
would still be unwarranted to conclude that the intuitions of both groups are equally deficient
from an epistemic point  of  view. In this way,  an evaluation of the epistemic credentials  of
incompatibilist intuitions should not be affected by their conflicts with compatibilist intuitions.
In sum, these brief considerations suffice to show that even if intuitions elicited by a given
thought-experiment  are  prone to  large  demographic  effects,  and thus  have a  low aggregate
reliability,  this  need not  be taken to  show that  each of  these diverging intuition is  equally
severely  deficient  from  an  epistemic  point  of  view.  An  improved  understanding  of  the
psychological processes that elicit intuitions allows us to make better informed assessments of
which of them are in a better epistemic standing, and which ones we should be wary of relying
on.  And  with  this  improved  understanding,  it  becomes  implausible  to  say  that  a  given
demography-specific intuition is epistemically deficient because it conflicts with the intuition of
another demographic group which we have good reason to think is mistaken. And so, there is
good reason to reject the formulation of the CCD that relies on the claim that intuitions found
prone to large demographic effects are unreliable.
 6. Conclusion
I have been evaluating the viability of the Challenge from Cognitive Diversity (CCD). Building
on Machery's perspicuous arguments which helpfully articulate and defend the epistemological
principles  driving  the  CCD,  I  distinguished  three  formulations  of  this  challenge.  The  first
focuses on the threat of irrationality arising from evidence of cognitive diversity; the second on
the threat of falsity arising from such findings; and the third on the idea that intuitions that are
prone to large demographic effects are unreliable. I then argued that all these three formulations
fail. The central upshot of these arguments is that the CCD is not as compelling as some have
suggested and that the upcoming international research effort testing for demographic variation
in philosophical intuitions will not be as revolutionary for the philosophical discipline as some
may think.
As a last note, it is important to emphasise what the arguments in this paper do not show. I have
not  argued  that  experimental  findings  never challenge  the  use  of  intuitions  as  evidence  in
philosophy. For example, I have not said anything about arguments to the effect that findings of
presentation  effects impugn the evidentiary status  of  intuitions.16 Likewise,  I  have  not  said
anything  about  how  empirical  findings  can  undermine  the  evidentiary  status  of  specific
intuitions. Indeed, as some of the studies in the Sources Project discussed in previous sections
persuasively  show,  some  intuitions  stem  from  the  operation  of  epistemically  problematic
cognitive processes. And so, there is good reason to avoid relying on them in any evidential
role. Also, I am not claiming that evidence of cognitive diversity fails to give rise to concerns
about the use of intuitions in philosophy. After all, if disagreements uncovered by evidence of
cognitive diversity are shown to  not be permissive, and if there is no information about the
psychological  processes  giving  rise  to  different  intuitions,  then  evidence  of  demographic
variation may be taken to show that intuitions are likely to be irrational, false, or unreliable.
However, the arguments in this paper demonstrate that it  is false to infer,  as many popular
attacks on the methodology of philosophy do, that mere observation that intuitions are prone to
demographic effects suffices to show them to be irrational, false, and/or unreliable.
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